Academic Year 2008-2009

Fact and Fiction in US-Iran Relations Before and After the Islamic Revolution: Lessons for Policy
February 11, 2009, 5:30PM
Cabot Intercultural Center, 7th floor
Speaker: Gholam R. Afkhami, Director of the Oral History Project, Foundation for Iranian Studies

Summary

Vali Nasr, Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School and Associate Director of the Fares Center, introduced Dr. Gholam R. Afkhami, Director of the Oral History Project at the Foundation for Iranian Studies, and his new book entitled “The Life and Times of the Shah.” Afkhami studied in the U.S. and taught in some of Iran’s leading universities before the revolution. He also worked in various capacities on development projects and held several government posts in Iran. Over the years, he has had several important intellectual contributions concerning the issue of state building and state restoration.

Afkhami commenced his lecture by discussing the significance of his new book. He emphasized that this work is based on primary sources and therefore looks at events and personalities somewhat differently from other accounts that talk about Iran during the revolutionary period.

The message that the book tries to convey is that there are many uncertainties that are typically involved in explaining revolutions. Most scholars look at revolutions through certain models and paradigms. Within the context of developing countries, they point to common patterns like corruption, faulty policies, and oppression, and derive ideas based on these patterns. The problem is that despite their explanatory value, these models largely fail to account for cases that are atypical. Indeed, these models tend to overlook attributes that are specific to exceptional cases. The result is a poor interpretation of events.

There are three key issues that the literature consistently misrepresents regarding the Iranian revolution. These misrepresentations play a critical role in shaping the contemporary international view of the Islamic republic.

The first issue is that of the 1953 coup d’état. The widely accepted narrative suggests that Mohammed Mosaddeq was popularly elected and then deposed through a CIA orchestrated conspiracy. However, the consensus among the primary sources used in the book suggests that the central reason behind Mosaddeq’s fall was because tremendous international challenges faced Iran at the time and Mosaddeq’s intransigence made things more difficult for the country. According to this narrative, it was really internal forces and not external ones that orchestrated his removal from power.

The second issue relates to the Shah’s rapport with the U.S. administration. Afkhami stresses that the common view, which is that the Shah was a U.S. puppet, is fundamentally wrong. In essence, the Shah believed that Iran was destined to be a powerful country with the potential to lead in the Middle East and possibly beyond. In order to do that, he understood that he had to gain the trust of the U.S. administration.

The final issue concerns the character of the Shah. Again, the common narrative distorts the truth by painting him as a despot who abused his power and oppressed the Iranian people. Afkhami argues that the fact of the matter was that he was a soft person who hated violence and repression.

These major distortions constitute the main pillars of a narrative that lends itself well to the rhetoric of the Islamic regime in Tehran and afford its leaders the opportunity to portray their regime as an agent of resistance to U.S. hegemony and oppression in the region. Nevertheless, Afkhami concludes, the reality is that the Islamic republic is based on a system that concentrates power in the hands of the Faqih and legalizes the condition of this empowerment.

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