Academic Year 2008-2009

The British Army, Counter-Insurgency and Strategy in Current Conflict
Wednesday, March 31, 2009, 5:30PM
Cabot Intercultural Center, 7th floor
Speaker: Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University

Summary

Hew Strachan, a distinguished Professor of the History of War at Oxford University, offered his remarks on the status of British counterinsurgency efforts based on numerous seminars he attended over the last five years. These seminars featured top UK generals speaking candidly about the changing nature of war, particularly as related to the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

Strachan opened with the startling fact that the British army is currently operating under a 12-year old policy, which, except for a section added in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, has remained unaltered despite ever-changing security concerns. This 1997 defense review is defined by its emphasis on expeditionary forces tasked with handling the full spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping to full-scale war, and emphasizes strategy-led policy as opposed to the capabilities driven policy of the previous defense review. Strachan particularly took issue with the review for failing to appreciate the unique challenges of low-intensity warfare.

Strachan went on to explain that in the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War, and even through most of 2004, Prime Minister Tony Blair based his policy on this outdated defense review. The blame is not, however, Blair’s alone; there were great systematic failures at work, as well. For example, in the UK, there is no proper machinery for developing strategy as there is in the U.S. under the National Security Council. The Cabinet is delegated with that responsibility, but was so divided in the run-up to the war that nothing substantial could be achieved. In addition, in the Ministry of Defense and within the armed forces themselves there was no readiness to engage politically with what was occurring in 2002. Prior successful campaigns in the Falklands, Iraq, and Kosovo provided a false sense of comfort regarding current capabilities. Strachan particularly took issue with the review for failing to appreciate the unique challenges of low-intensity warfare. Its drafters believed that if the army were trained for major war, it would be capable of low intensity warfare including counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The armed forces themselves were similarly confident in their ability to successfully execute COIN operations based on their experience in Northern Ireland.

Once in Iraq, the UK was unable to fill the civil vacuum that occurred after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The army was tasked with providing security, aiding reconstruction efforts and promoting long-term development, but was only trained for the first. The mission also suffered from a confused command structure, which created doubt as to whether command lay in the field or in UK headquarters and was further complicated by a unified civil and military structure.

British COIN doctrine is currently undergoing review by the Army and a joint-service task force. In response to other failures observed during the Iraq campaign, a post-conflict reconstruction unit was created and attempts have been made to foster greater cooperation between the civilian and military forces. However, a lack of continuity of command and confusion on the ground regarding the chain of command still create immense problems in current operations.

Strachan concluded his presentation by noting the key issues currently facing the British military establishment. First, should Afghanistan be the basis for the defense review that is slated to occur in 2010? After all, several UK commanders claim that the UK will remain in Afghanistan for 20-30 years. Second, it is imperative that the UK finds a COIN doctrine that works. In a major war, Strachan argues, one has only to be right most of the time, but in COIN operations a single civilian death could potentially undo any or all gains achieved.

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