Academic Year 2007-2008

The Middle East at 2008: Challenges for the US
October 3, 2007, 5:30PM
Speaker: Shai Feldman, Brandeis University

Summary

Shai Feldman, Judy and Sidney Swartz Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and Professor of Politics at Brandeis University, focused his remarks on a number of characteristics that define the Middle East today.  Additionally, he recommended approaches and priorities that should be considered by current candidates for the U.S. presidency.

Feldman noted that the prevailing weakness of the Arab state system has implications for individual states and the region as a whole. When Arab governments do not provide for their citizens effectively, sub-state groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah create successful health and welfare systems in their stead. Additionally, the rise of sectarianism over nationalism provokes cycles of labeling and mislabeling—as in the case of Hamas being mistakenly associated with the Shi`a sect. Feldman proposed that the decline of national media outlets, the rise of regional news sources, and the loosened controls over information are both catalysts for and products of the increasing weakness of Arab states. Not only has this vulnerability exposed Arab states to the influence of regional players such as Israel, Iran, and Turkey, but it also makes Arab affairs more susceptible to intervention by Western powers such as the United States.

Related to the weakness of Arab states, the proliferation of insurgencies is another distinguishing characteristic of the Middle East. Feldman cited the nuclei of al-Qaeda cells in Iraq, Gaza, and Sinai, as well as the Hezbollah militia and the Hamas Brigades as examples of active insurgencies. For such sub-state actors, expectations are relatively low and success is defined by mere survival. Insurgencies gain popular support by the act of seeking confrontation with established powers. Thus, the proliferation of insurgencies has increased the frequency—if not the long-term impact—of conflicts with legitimate state actors.

Feldman observed that the neo-conservative project of cultivating peace through democratization in the Middle East has failed. Muslim societies are not incapable of generating democracy without assistance from external powers. Yet, free and fair electoral processes have not necessarily yielded pacifist leadership in the region. The Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006 resulted in the empowerment of Hamas, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad campaigned successfully against former Iranian president Rafsanjani in June 2005. Moreover, the dismemberment of Iraq has enabled Iran to emerge as a primary threat to U.S. allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia.

In Feldman’s view, the Turkish experiment could become a productive model for other regional powers. In August 2007, amid vocal opposition from supporters of secularism, Abdullah Gül was elected president of Turkey. Despite his control over the state’s parliament, government, and presidency, Gül has expressed his commitment to the secular state system. Feldman noted that much of Gül’s success depends upon the evolving European attitude toward Turkey. Yet, whether or not Turkey is granted full membership in the European Union, informal associations with Europe could still prove beneficial. Memos of understanding have served to formalize relations between Israel and the United States, and such arrangements could be replicated between Turkey and European powers. Ultimately, President Gül’s successes could serve as lessons for governments in Egypt, Iran, and Syria, which uphold policies that exclude Islamists from participation in political processes.

Finally, the intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict contributes to the climate of the Middle East today. Feldman identified the Clinton Parameters of December 2000 as a viable blueprint for sustainable peace, and he cited significant support for facets of the parameters among both Israeli and Palestinian opinion polls. Despite this support, the Arab-Israeli conflict maintains a strong immune system against attempts at resolution by external forces. In Feldman’s view, both Israelis and Palestinians are justified in asking whether or not an honest broker exists on either side of the conflict.

In order for the United States to engage effectively with the Middle East, Feldman recommended that American policymakers hone a sophisticated understanding of the region. Matching the level of resources devoted to analyzing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States must commit increased financial and human resources to deciphering the Middle East. U.S. policy should consist of redefining its interests in the region, developing a grand strategy for fulfilling those interests, and articulating that strategy to the American public. Without these elements, confusion will manifest into a power vacuum that gives way to simplistic, ideological, and single-variable explanations.

As part of its defense strategy, the United States must reassess military threats that originate from the region. Feldman divided possible military scenarios into the categories of conventional war, unconventional insurgency, and terrorism. He explained that each of these offensives has a different rhythm that requires a specific mindset for a successful response. Furthermore, the use of multiple confrontation styles by regional actors requires a dynamic methodology that allows for rapid transitions among counterstrategies.

The Iraq War has become a flashpoint for the region, which detracts from any productive initiatives that the United States has taken or supported in the Middle East. Subsequent to the eventual withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, the United States will face a number of challenges—among them the development and marketing of jihadist narratives of defeat over the United States. In anticipation of these hurdles, the United States must prepare action points for dealing with the consequences of regime change.

In the context of its encompassing strategy for containment of the region, the United States must develop a doctrine for deterring Iran. In doing so, the United States will likely need to make alliances with imperfect allies. Feldman posited that democratization efforts might need to take a backseat to pressing security concerns. At the same time, the rise of sub-state movements raises the question of engaging Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The United States will need to weigh the security implications of befriending opposition parties that threaten the political preservation of established leaders of U.S. allies in the region.

Finally, the next U.S. administration must dedicate a well-defined level of resources toward addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict. Feldman noted that the conflict is unusual in that negotiating practicalities is often easier than agreeing upon the principles underlying those practicalities. Given its historical role in conflict resolution efforts, the United States must continue to develop strategies for stabilization that are tied to a larger theory of accommodation. Ideologically, Hamas cannot accept an agreement that Abu Mazen and Ehud Olmert agree upon—despite the fact that Israeli and Palestinian populations might support the content of that agreement. Thus, Feldman recommended a departure from the Permanent Status Agreement. Instead, he suggested that Hamas would be able to endorse an agreement focused on practicalities that prioritize armistice over peace.

By Julia Bennett (MALD ’08)