Academic Year 2007-2008

The Pakistan Crisis
January 30, 2008, 5:30PM
Speakers: Shahla Haeri, Boston University; Hussain Haqqani, Boston University

Summary

Ambassador Hussain Haqqani, Director of the Center for International Relations and Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston University, and Shahla Haeri, Director of the Women's Studies Program and Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Boston University, spoke about the current situation in Pakistan following the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Their remarks explored both the reasons for and the repercussions of the assassination on Pakistan, South Asia, and women in politics.

Crisis has been a continuous theme in Pakistan's history, Haqqani observed, noting that the phenomenon has led him to examine Pakistan's origins at the partition of 1947. He attributed the country's predicaments to what he refers to as the seven paradoxes and five fissures of Pakistan.

The first paradox lies in the fact that Pakistan is an ancient land but a new country, born with "very little homework and no game plan." Military strengthening with American dollars has resulted in a strong state but a weak nation, which has affected the internal power scale. The second paradox addresses Pakistan's aspirations to become closer with the Middle East despite being categorized under the United States Central Command as South Asian. More than unity with the Middle East by default, Pakistan wants closer ties to the U.S. military, Gulf oil, and religious sympathy with the Muslim homeland. The third paradox deals with Pakistan's new position as the epicenter of Islamic radicalism, which contradicts Pakistan's traditional religious tolerance. Haqqani extended the theme of radicalism by claiming that many Pakistanis have a softer spot for Osama bin Laden than they do for George W. Bush, a point that he used to explain his fourth paradox: increasing anti-Americanism despite Pakistan being a major ally of the United States since the Eisenhower administration. The fifth paradox addresses the discrepancy between the consensus of the Pakistani people in aspiring to democracy and the fact that they live under a military dictatorship. This dictatorship is responsible for Pakistan's status as the only non-secure nuclear state, wherein the sixth paradox lies. The Pakistani people fear division and thus rely heavily upon military spending, whereby little funds are left for development after being spent on fighter planes. The seventh and final paradox offers a more sanguine anomaly in Pakistan's economic spectrum; it maintains that despite political assassinations, terrorist attacks, functional oscillation, and aid suspension, Pakistan has consistently experienced economic growth ever since its independence.

With these foundational paradoxes in mind, Haqqani described five fissures that have resulted and plagued the Pakistani socio-political sphere. First, an ethnic cleavage separates the masses from those of muhajer backgrounds, typically returning immigrants in possession of wealth and education that have "oligarchized" the nation. Haqqani cited democracy as the only method of disempowering these elites. Ethnic matters also characterize the second fissure, in which a number of Pakistani ethnic groups geographically overlap with neighboring countries, creating a sense of divided loyalties. The government's attempt to curb these ethno-nationalisms by promoting an Islamic ideal has fallen short, given the fact that the government itself is perceived as removed from Islam. Third, the question of Pakistan's position as the Muslim homeland of South Asia becomes contentious when the proper body to handle administration according to an Islamic ideology must be determined. This fissure taps into the nature and future of Pakistani identity. Haqqani recognized economics as a fourth chasm, citing the grim fact that 113 million Pakistani nationals are either poor or transitionally poor in a country of 160 million. This disconnect has manifested itself in privileged and underprivileged ways of thinking, in which the rich were stunned when Benazir Bhutto won the elections, underestimating the power of the poor vote that perceived the Bhuttos as working in  favor of the lower class. Finally, the last fissure deals with the crevasse between the civil and military points of view, in which the civil consensus for democracy is countered by increasingly powerful technocrats, who are supportive of the military regime and who constantly argue that Pakistan is not fit for democracy.

Dr. Shahla Haeri focused on the gender of the former Prime Minister, and she considered its significance for South Asian politics. She explored the elements that enabled the election of a woman twice in Pakistan -- even though Islam has the stigma of being inherently incompatible with female leadership. Haeri tackled her subject from a theoretical and historical perspective, stating that Bhutto was among a long line of South Asian female leaders that stretches from antiquity to the contemporary world. The question then lies in the juxtaposition of women in power with the high number of poor women in the same region. Haeri attributed this paradox to the specificity of feudalism in Pakistan, where the oppression of both men and women is due to the fact that wealth is concentrated in the hands of the few. Thus, it would seem that the way for women to exercise authority would be to inherit land. But this enabling mechanism is complicated by a less obvious paradigm: the relationship between a patriarch and his daughter.

While men are strongly valued in South Asia, the father-son axis is often a nexus of tension and rivalry that can -- and has -- led to fear, resentment, and even murder. Countering the father-son ideal is the more obscure occurrence of a male bestowing land and prestige on his daughter and grooming her for leadership, as was the case with Benazir Bhutto, whose father Zulfiqar chose her over her male siblings to succeed him. However, one cannot at the same time dismiss the fact that Bhutto also relied upon Islamic support, as she agreed to an arranged marriage and symbolically adorned the head cover, circumventing fundamentalist critics of her position.

Judging by the throngs of male supporters that surrounded her, Bhutto's gender seemed insignificant to South Asian politics. In her closing comments, Haeri agreed with Haqqani that the group with the most to gain from Bhutto's death is the Pakistani military. Although she did not rule out the possibility of fanatical religious elements wanting to teach Muslim women a lesson by killing Bhutto, she emphasized the historical comparison to the thirteenth century Razia Sultan, ruler of Delhi in India. While Razia Sultan was hounded by religious elements, she would be finally undone by the military. It seems that in contemporary Pakistan, history has once again proven its cyclical nature.

By Tarek Zeidan (MALD '09)